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1. Participatory and non-participatory
make-believe
In the introduction to his book Image and mind, Gregory Currie
asks: “What role does imagination play in our response to fictions '2”?
Following Kendall Walton, he argues that spectators adopt an attitude
of make—believe or imagining in relation to fictions (to fictional
actions, characters, and events). Both Currie and Walton therefore
argue that fictions appeal, not to belief, but to imagination. One
consequence is that film spectators are not subjected to an illusion, or
false belief, when watching a fiction film. Instead, they generate
simulated beliefs, or beliefs that “run off-line”, in Currie’s phrase.
Currie gives an example :
Compare believing that you are confronted by a dangerous
bear with imagining that you are. Imagining there is a bear in
I Associate Professor of Film Studies, Chapman University, USA.
2 G. CURRIE, Image and mind: film , philosophy, and cognitive science, New York,
Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. xii.
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front of me, just like believing there is one, may cause a
decision to flee. But in the imaginary case the decision itself is
an imaginary one‘.
Similarly when watching fiction films : when confronted with an
image of a bear, spectators imagine being confronted by a bear. But
we do not flee because the confrontation is simulated, and our
decision to flee is imaginary. Our mental processes therefore run off-
line, and are disconnected from normal behavioural outputs. Currie
calls this the “Simulation Hypothesis”. Walton develops a similar
theory in his book Mimesis as make-believez. He considers a film
spectator, named Charles, watching a horror film containing a
threatening green slime. Walton attempts to characterize Charles’
experience of feeling threatened. Walton concludes that Charles does
not actually fear the slime, for it is fictional (or imaginary, or make-
believe) that he fears it. “It is fictional that he is afraid, and it is
fictional that he says he is”3. Charles is therefore participating in a
game of make--believe with the film. But crucially, in opposition to
Walton, Currie argues that the make-believe only refers to the content
of a fiction, not the spectator’s perceptual relation to the fictional
content.
Spectators do, of course, have real perceptual relations to real
events when watching a film -we actually see a photographic
representation of film actors, props, and sets. This is what Noel
Carroll calls “physical portrayal“. But beyond this, Currie denies that
film spectators have imagined perceptual relations to fictional events.
“The question”, he points out, “is whether the make-believe is
participatory in the minimal sense that it requires us to imagine that
we stand in direct perceptual relations to the characters and events
depicted”5. Do we “imagine that we stand in direct perceptual
relations to the [fictional] characters and events depicted” ? And if so,
how are spectators oriented in relation to these fictional events ‘? This
is the crucial question I address in this paper.
1 1bid., p. 150.
2 K. WALTON, Mimesis as make-believe." on the foundations of the representational
arts, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1990.
3 1bid., p. 242.
4 N. CARROLL, Philosophical problems of classical film theory, Princeton, Princ zton
University Press, 1988, pp. 149-52.
5 G. CURRIE, “Visual fictions”, The Philosophical Quarterly, n° 163, April 1991,
p. 135.
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The question involves determining if two levels of make-
believe/imagining exist in watching a fiction film, or only one level:
firstly, do spectators take an attitude of make-believe to the events of
the fiction ‘? And secondly, do spectators take an attitude of make-t
believe in the perceptual relations they establish to those events ? I
shall argue that both levels of make-believe are necessary for a fiction
to be perceived as fictional, for it is the spectator’s participation that
makes a fiction ﬁctional. This is because fiction is epistemological,
not ontological ; it is not an inherent property of a film, but the result
of the film spectator’s disposition, or mode of attention, towards a
film‘. For Currie, only one level of make-believe exists — spectators
only take an attitude of make-believe to the events of the fiction, not
to their perceptual relation to the fiction. In effect, Currie is arguing
that spectators stand outside fictions, that make-believe is non-
participatory, that spectators are not oriented in fictional spaces. He is
therefore rejecting the Participatory Thesis, or the Imagined Observer
Hypothesis (IOH) : the idea that spectators participate in fictions, that
they occupy the position of an imagined observer in the fiction :
“What I shall object to is the idea that cinematic works encourage us
to imagine ourselves to be observers of the fictional events, placed
within the world of the fiction”? In Currie’s own terminology, he is
rejecting imagining seeing or personal imagining (what Christopher
Peacocke calls “imagining from the inside” of a fiction) in favour of
impersonal imagining (or imagining from the outside of a fiction).
Currie’s reasoning is straightforward and literal minded. He
points out that the two main premises of personal imagining, or
imagining seeing, are that, firstly, spectators imagine seeing the
fictional events of the film ; and secondly, they imagine seeing them
from the camera’s position, or the film’s intrinsic perspective. He
rejects the first premise because fictional objects, characters, and
events do not exist. Therefore, he asks, “How can we have a visual-
perceptual relation to something that does not exist ‘?”3 He rejects the
i Spectators cannot, of course, freely choose to perceive a film as fictional or non-
fictional. This process is constrained by institutions. In a documentary film,
spectators are encouraged to remain on the level of physical portrayal and to
downplay imagined perceptual relations to the images, because the events
portrayed are real, not fictional. See R. ODIN, “A semio-pragmatic approach to the
documentary film,” in W. BUCKLAND (ed.), The film spectator : from sign to mind,
Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 1995, pp. 227-35.
2 G. CURRIE, Image and mind, op. cit., p. 166.
3 Ibid., p. 184.
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second premise, that spectators occupy the film’s intrinsic perspective
as constructed by the camera, because it leads to some absurd
consequences. Every time a film cuts to another shot, its intrinsic
perspective changes, for the camera’s position changes. And
according to the IOH, film spectators can imagine themselves
successively occupying each new camera position. For Currie, such a
premise “seems to misdescribe the experience of movie watching”.
He adds that “Do I really identify my visual system, in imagination,
with the camera, and imagine myself to be placed where the camera
is ‘? Do I imagine myself on the battleground, mysteriously immune to
the violence around me, lying next to the lovers, somehow invisible to
them, viewing Earth from deep space one minute, watching the dinner
guests from the ceiling the next ?”‘
Like Kendall Walton, Murray Smith, Jerrold Levinson, among
others, I am sceptical of Currie’s rejection of the second premise of
the IOH, for spectators are necessarily oriented in a film’s fictional
space by perceptual relations, they are imaginatively placed in direct
relation to fictional objects. After all, if we are not projected into a
fictional world, we cannot perceive it as a fiction, for we remain on
the level of physical portrayal, or ocular deixis. Currie seems to reject
the IOH on the basis of a number of awkward consequences or
entailments —that it entails spectators are placed on the battlefield, etc.
But defenders of the IOH argue that imagining seeing is precisely
that : a form of seeing that does not entail the spectator’s physical
embodiment in the fiction. This implies that our relation to fiction is
asymmetrical in terms of access : we see fictional characters, but
because we are not physically embodied in the fiction, they cannot see
us. The crucial issue is the status of our seeing and our embodiment in
the fiction.
By identifying the awkward consequences of the IOH as pseudo
problems, we find no reason to reject imagining seeing. We can even
use Currie’s Simulation Hypothesis to restate the IOH : When
watching a film, I imagine I am seeing a bear from close proximity,
but I do not believe I am actually positioned near the bear. I simply
simulate the belief that I am seeing the bear from close proximity.
And the simulation of a visual reception point (I imagine being close
to the bear in this example) increases my simulated fear.
1 [bid., p. 171.
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Recent film philosophers have argued that looking at motion
pictures involves more than the simple act of actual seeing, but we
still need to determine the degree of imaginative seeing that exists.
We need, therefore, to articulate more clearly the relation between
seeing, mental representations, imagination, and systems of signs that
orient the individual in physical and fictional spaces. To do this I need
to investigate the work of Currie and Walton in terms of the work of
Karl Biihler and George Lakoffi. In the 1930s Biihler examined the
behaviour of individuals, especially the way they orient themselves in
real and fictional spaces. Lakoff has developed a theory of embodied
cognition (image schemata directly motivated by the body) to explain
how individuals interact with and create meaning from their
environment.
In Chapter 2 of The Cognitive Semiotics of Film I argue (by
means of Lakoff’ s work) that perception is embodied, by grounding it
in the physicality of the bodyz. In this paper I go one step further and
attempt to ground the individual’s spatial orientation (in real and
fictional spaces) in the physicality of the body. I agree with George
Legrady who comments that :
To experience space is to engage with it through one’s
presence, to possess it by being immersed in it, in the same
way one possesses space when inside a room, in a park, or on
the streets. Computer generated virtual, immersive
environments create the illusion of space by simulating visual
clues such as boundary delineations which allows us to
perceive directionally and to circulate3.
Individuals engage with and immerse themselves in —although in
different ways— physical, fictional, and virtual spaces. In the
following pages I examine the way individuals engage with and
immerse themselves in film space through their bodily presence, and
end with a few comments on bodily engagement with virtual space.
1 K. BUHLER, Theory of language, translated by Donald Fraser Goodwin,
Amsterdam, John Benjamins, 1990. G. LAKOFF, Women, fire, and dangerous
things : what categories reveal about the mind, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1987.
2 W. BUCKLAND, The cognitive semiotics offilm, New York, Cambridge University
Press, 2000, Chapter 2.
3 G. LEGRADY, “intersecting the virtual and the real : space in interactive media
installations,” Wide Angie, vol. 21, n° 1, January 1999, p. 105. ~
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For a visual representation of all the terms and concepts I use, see
Figure l.
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Figure I
2. Imagination-oriented deixis
In watching a fiction film, the spectator’s vision and body image
are transported from his or her immediate physical, local space to a
remote space (the space of the film’s fiction). What fundamental
spatial properties of the physical, local space are carried over and/or
simulated in the remote space ? The fundamental spatial properties
include :
— Topology
— Orientation
— Distance
-~ Containment, and
- Movement
All these spatial properties are important for studying the
fundamental spatial properties of film images, but here I shall delimit
my research to orientation.
Two fundamental questions we need to ask about orientation
are : what space ? And : what type of orientation ? The two types of
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spaces to which I will refer are real space and its cognitive
representation - imaginative space. (Both are in opposition to abstract
spaces such as those constructed in pure mathematics, for example).
What type of orientation ? There are three basic types : absolute,
intrinsic, and contextual. Absolute orientation refers to cardinal
directions (North, South, East, West), which collectively represent an
objective frame of reference within global space, therefore enabling
absolute orientation. Intrinsic orientation originates from the
properties of objects (e.g., their symmetry) and the frame of reference
for intrinsic orientation in a three dimensional space consists of three
axes : up/down, front/back, and left/right. Finally, in contextual
orientation, the frame of reference consists of two relative points, for
example a speaker and objects or events to which he or she refers.
This type of orientation is called deictic, and is not limited to (has
never been limited to) verbal language.
My discussion of orientation will focus on contextual orientation
in both real and imagined spaces or, more particularly, contextual
orientation in the real and imagined spaces of fiction films (for fiction
films combine at the same time real and imagined spaces).
A few words on the two main contextual reference points :
Objects in both real space and imagined space (or, more
specifically, signs in an environmental space). .
I-here-now (the speaker’s or spectator’s zero point) ; both verbal
language and narrative films are egocentric, that is, centred
around the speaker or spectator’s ego [or their body, since the
ego is simply the cognitive representation of the body in the
mindl) ; although the ego is only a contextual reference point, for
each individual their ego is experienced as an absolute reference
point ; this reference point is also a necessary characteristic of
imagining - that is, imagining is necessarily egocentric, or
personal, in opposition to Currie’s suggestion that it is
impersonal.
In the 1930s Karl Blihler developed a situational model of action,
which involves studying the way individuals are embedded in an
environment and how they meaningfully (rather than randomly)
interact with it. For Biihler, the fundamental type of interaction is
orientation. Individuals are not, therefore, passively placed in space,
but are actively engaged with, immersed in, and interact with it. One’s
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very presence in a space creates a form of contextual orientation,
although the orientation process is not complete until the individual
establishes a coordinated relationship with his environment and
mentally represents it. Moreover, it is through vision by which
humans primarily orient themselves in real space and create mental
representation of that space (although other senses, such as hearing
and touching, play a lesser role). This is why Biihler calls orientation
in real, physical spaces “ocular deixis”.
The spectator’s deictic reference point in real space is shifted to
an imaginative reference point when watching a fiction film. Biihler
argues that deictic terms can be used when the individual is
coordinated to an imagined visual space. In opposition to ocular
deixis (the orientation of the individual in a real, physical space),
Btihler calls orientation in imagination “imagination-oriented deixis”.
Moreover, he identifies three types, and uses the parable of
Mohammed and the mountain‘ :
a. imagination-oriented deixis in which objects come to the individual
(Mohammed imagines the mountain coming to him) ;
b. imagination-oriented deixis in which the individual undertakes an
imaginary journey (Mohammed imagines going to the mountain) ;
c. imagination-oriented deixis which combines orientation in
imagination with ocular deixis (Mohammed sees an imaginary
mountain from the position of his actual perception).
In outlining the second category in more detail, Buhler writes :
“When -Mohammed feels displaced to the mountain, his present tactile
body image is connected with an imagined optical scene. For this
reason he is able to use the local deictic words here and there and
the directional words forwards, back ; right, left on the phantasy
product or imagined object just as well as in the primary situation of
actual perception”? The two crucial points here are that a “tactile
body image is connected with an imagined optical scene” and that,
within the imagined optical scene, the individual can orient him or
herself. Btihler reinforces this point when he elaborates on the third
type of imagination-oriented deixis (which can be developed to
explain perception in the cinema) : every individual displaced in
imagination “takes his present tactile body image with him, to put it
1 K. BUHLER, Chapter 8, Theory of language, op. cit.
2 Ibid., p. 153.
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metaphorically. He takes it along in the second type (displacement) ;
he retains his present tactile body image together with his optical
orientation within actual perception from the very beginning in the
first type and integrates what he imagines into it”1. He concludes :
“To what extent it is possible to superimpose or otherwise to combine
remains an open question from a purely psychological point of
view”? Since Btihler wrote this I think it has become less of an open
question, particularly after reading the work of cognitive semanticists
such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who oppose “objectivism”
and emphasize the human nature of the mind and cognition — or, more
specifically, argue that all cognition is embodied. Lakoff : “where
objectivism defines meaning independently of the nature and
experience of thinking beings, experiential realism [or cognitive
semantics] characterizes meaning in terms of embodiment, that is, in
terms of our collective biological capacities and our physical and
social experiences as beings functioning in our environment”3. Lakoff
is using a broad definition of the term “experience,” one that includes
everything which plays a role in constructing human understanding,
from the genetic make-up of our bodies to the way the body interacts
with its social environment. Lakoff stresses that this is not simply a
return to classical empiricism, where experience is understood as
passively received sense impressions, since “experience does not
determine conceptual systems, but only motivates them”4.
To specify what they mean by embodiment, Lakoff and Johnson
make the distinction between conceptual structure and preconceptual
bodily experiences, and employ the notion of embodiment to argue
that conceptual structure arises from (or is motivated by)
preconceptual bodily experiences. The distinction is not therefore
based on the opposition between structured concepts/unstructured
I lbid., p. 154.
2 Ibid.
3 G. LAKOFF, Women, fire, and dangerous things, op. cit., pp. 266-267. See also
M. JOHNSON, The body in the mind .' the bodily basis of meaning, imagination, and
reason, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987. Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory
of embodied meaning resembles Thomas A. Sebeok’s theory of the biosemiotic
self. For Sebeok, each species constructs, according to its own unique sensory and
bodily structure and functions, its own Umwelt (its own perception of the outer
world). Due to the variation in the biological make up of each species, it is
plausible to argue that different species live in different sensory worlds. See
TH. A. SEBEOK, An introdttction to semiotics, London, Pinter Publishers, 1994, esp.
pp. 5, ll-12, 113,122-23.
4 G. LAKOFF, Women, fire, and dangerous things, op. cit., p. 310.
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experiences, for both authors argue that experience is itself structured
and is already meaningful.
Lakoff characterizes experience in terms of kinesthetic image
schemata, which are simple structures that arise from the body -such
as up-down, back-front, centre-periphery, part-whole, inside-outside,
paths, links, forces, and so on. These schemata are directly
constrained by the dimensions of the human body. And because the
dimensions of the fully-grown body are shared (uniform and
constant), any discussion of conceptual structure in terms of the body
does not fall into radical relativism and subjectivism. Image schemata
are not, therefore, arbitrary, but are directly motivated by a shared and
constant bodily experience.
The structure of our shared bodily experience then becomes the
basis for rational, abstract thought by means of image based schemata
and creative strategies such as metaphor and metonymy, which
project and extend this structure from the physical domain into the
abstract domain of concepts. As Johnson observes : “Through
metaphor, we can make use of patterns that obtain in our physical
experience to organize our more abstract understanding“.
It will be useful to compare the above remarks by Buhler and
Lakoff with Gregory Currie’s position. For Currie, it is not part of the
film spectator’s imagination that he or she sees anything from the
film’s intrinsic perspective. He denies that film spectators are guided
and oriented in fictional space, for they are firmly grounded in “ocular
deixis”, or the material, physical dimensions of the film image. To
repeat an earlier point : if we do not project ourselves into the fiction,
then (pace Currie) we cannot perceive it as a fiction.
Furthermore, Currie argues that spectatorscannot be oriented in
relation to fictional objects, characters, and events of a film, for such
objects, being fictional, do not exist. Btihler acknowledges this issue
when he notes that “The central question from a psychological point
of view is how it is possible to guide and be guided when oriented
on something absent”? Btihler’s response is the third type of
imagination-oriented deixis, in which our imagining seeing is
combined with or filtered through actual seeing. A fictional image
invokes a spectator’s perceptual orientation to that image, both real
and imagined.
I M. JOHNSON, The body in the mind, op. cir., p. xv.
2 K. BUHLER, Theory of language, op. cit., p. 142.
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Noel Carroll offers a similar answer. His distinction (by way of
Monroe Beardsley) is useful here : the distinction between “physical
portrayal”, “depiction”, and “nominal portrayal”1. “Physical
portrayal” refers to film’s recording or documentation of the reality in
front of the camera, and is found in Andre Bazin’s definition of film
realism in terms of film’s indexical imprint of realityz, as well as in
definitions of the documentary. A physical portrayal represents a
particular person, place or event. Therefore, a particular shot from
Citizett Kane represents Orson Welles. “Depictions” and “nominal
portrayals” separate the photographic image from the reality that
caused it. When we think of a photographic image as a depiction, we
focus on it as a member of a class (the photograph of Orson Welles
also depicts the general term “man”). A nominal portrayal “represents
a particular object, person, place, or event different from the one that
gave rise to the image”-°‘. In this sense, in Citizen Kane Orson Welles
nominally portrays Charles Foster Kane. More generally, Carroll
writes : “nominal portrayal is the basis of all fiction film”‘*. This is
because the spectator needs to go beyond the particular physical
portrayal and perceive or infer a particular fictional character. In
fiction films, the photographic image is simply a means to an end.
Spectators look through the physical portrayal to the nominal
portrayal by way of imagining seeing. This explains how film
spectators can look at fictions — the physical portrayal is a prop in a
game of make-believe, in Walton’s terms. Just as a child sees a tree
stump and imagines seeing a bear (to use Walton’s example), film
spectators see Orson Welles in Citizen Kane and imagine seeing
Charles Foster Kane. The level of fiction and imagining seeing are
therefore interrelated, for fictional entities only come into being
through the act of imagining seeing - moreover, through the act of
personal imagining seeing. By means of Biihler and Lakoff, we have
refuted Currie’s theory of impersonal imagining, and replaced it with
a theory of personal imagining or imagination-oriented deixis, in
which spectators are contextually oriented in the fictional space of a
film by means of a mental representation of their own body image.
1 N. CARROLL, Pizilosop/deal probiems ofclassical fiim theory, op. cit., pp. 149-52.
2 A. BAZiN, “The ontology of the photographic image,” trans. Hugh Gray, What is
citiemo?, vol. l, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, pp. 9-16.
3: N. CARROLL, P/tiiosophicol problems ofclassicalfilm theory, op. cit, p. 151.
Ibid.
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3. Fictional and virtual spaces
I have begun to explore the relation between literal and fictional
space in fiction films, as well as the spectator’s literal and imaginative
orientation in relation to fictional entities (particularly the spectator’s
location in relation to the fictional geography). Are there any
additional applications of these ideas, apart from refuting Currie’s
theory of impersonal imagining, and replacing it with a theory of
personal imagining '? So far I have identified four :
1. Explain how films move from the non-fictional level (ocular deixis)
to the fictional level (imagination-oriented deixis), especially in
opening sequences ;
2. Develop the concept of focalization in relation to fiction films ;
3. Identify levels of fiction ;
4. Analyze the individual’s interface with virtual reality.
3.1. From non-fiction to fiction
The transition from the non-fictional to the fictional level is
something spectators normally take for granted when watching fiction
films. Each film, however, does not simply transport or displace our
vision and body image to a fictional space. We need to consider the
process by which this displacement takes place.
I have chosen the opening of North by Northwest (Alfred
Hitchcock, 1959) as an example. The sequence begins with non-
fictional elements: orchestral music, the MGM logo, and actors’
names -- which slide effortlessly on frame, across an abstract grid
drawn at an angle to the screen’s surface, and off frame. As the film’s
title moves upwards, the grid dissolves into a fictional space, the side
of an office block, which replicates the angle and design of the non-
fictional space it replaces. This is simply the first stage in the
transition from the non-fictional to the fictional level. The credits
continue to effortlessly slide on and off frame ; they seem to slide
along the side of the office block — that is, they simulate an interaction
with the fictional space. This sliding movement draws attention to the
boundary between the non-fictional and fictional levels.
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Eventually a change of shot takes place ; in fact, a series of seven
shots follow, of the rush hour. Three titles are superimposed over
these seven images (including a disclaimer that the events, characters,
and firms are fictitious). The titles continue to slide on and off frame ;
their separateness from the fictional events is emphasized because
they remain on screen through the shot transitions (emphasizing that
they are imposed over the images). The interaction between
Hitchcock and his own director credit is of interest. He literally
follows his name - he almost “chases” his name off frame (simulating
an interaction between non-fiction and fiction). Like all the titles,
Hitchc0ck’s credit slides effortlessly over the image, while Hitchcock
is shown immobilized in the image, as he is prevented from getting
onto a bus. Hitchcock is therefore represented on both the fictional
and non-fictional levels and, within the fictional level, he is nominally
portrayed (he is an extra in the crowd) ; however, for the cinephile, he
is physically portrayed (he is the film’s director).
The first post-credit shot reveals the fictional space of the
following scene -~ an establishing shot in which the spectator has now
crossed the threshold from non-fiction to fiction, from ocular deixis to
imagination-oriented deixis. However, crossing the threshold does not
involve rejecting the first level for the second, but involves combining
the two, as Btihler suggested in his discussion of the third type of
imagination-oriented deixis. This third type closely resembles seeing
in the cinema — except, of course, in the cinema there is more
emphasis on ocular deixis (actual seeing) than in Biihler’s example.
3.2. Focalization and levels of ﬁction
Edward Branigan has developed a sophisticated theory of
narrative agents and levels of narration in the cinema‘. The focalizer
is a fundamental narrative agent who acts as a mediator between the
fictional events and the spectator. With the assistance of the focalizer,
the spectator becomes contextually and intrinsically oriented in
fictional space. In addition, Branigan identifies eight levels of filmic
narration, each one created by an narrative agent, and each one
1 See E. BRANIGAN, Narrative comprehension andfiim, New York, Routledge, 1992
and W. BUCKLAND, “Narration and focalisation in Wings of Desire,” Cit-re/elation,
n° 56, September 2001, pp. 26-33.
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describing a realm of the film’s “reality”. At the topmost level is the
film as a material text, created by an historical author. Other levels
include the story world, plus the focalized levels representing the
external perceptions and internal thoughts of characters in that story
world.
The levels of fiction I am proposing exist on the boundary
between external and internal focalization. Total Recall (Paul
Verhoeven, 1990) presents three alternative “levels of reality” for the
main protagonist Doug Quaid to inhabit -~ or, perhaps we can say,
different possible worlds, for each alternative world only has a
potential existence (unless you are a modal realist). At key points in
the film, both Doug Quaid and the spectator are confused about which
level of reality is operative. Is Quaid simply a lowly construction
worker on Earth ? Or is he strapped into a chair at Rekall being fed
memories of a trip to Mars, pretending to live the life of a secret
agent ? Or is he really a secret agent on Mars, working in collusion
with Cohaagen to kill the leader of the Mars resistance ‘? The spectator
is placed with or focalized around Quaid’s experience of these
different levels of fiction. Like Quaid, we are disoriented for we do
not know which level of fiction is “true,” and which ones are false. A
cognitive reading of Total Recall may not (indeed, should not) resolve
the film’s inherently ambiguous levels of fiction, but should aim to
bring them into sharper focus.
E.ristenZ (David Cronenberg, 1999) also presents three levels of
reality, and creates ambiguity concerning what level the characters are
living in. But by the end of the film, it is evident that the film began
on level two (in a computer game), progressed to level three (a
computer game within a computer game), and then ended on level one
(the characters’ real life) — although a throwaway ending “challenges”
this reading. The confusion of levels is simply caused by the fact that
each level imitates the others, and the film begins on level two, not
level one. p
A fuller analysis would involve combining levels of
fiction/possible worlds analysis with focalization, for the different
possible worlds have a psychological origin. Indeed, the first three
practical applications of a theory of fictional orientation are
interrelated and should, ideally, be combined.
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3.3. Interface with virtual reality
The fourth application, to virtual reality, seems to conform more
strongly to Biihler’s third type of imagination-oriented deixis, for a
virtual reality environment also combines ocular deixis with an
imagined, fictional space. However, virtual reality environments
reverse the priority found in the cinema, for they emphasize
imagination and downplay ocular deixis. But this is not to suggest we
have an “out of body” experience when engaging with virtual reality.
What we need to consider in more detail is the specific experience of
engaging a virtual environment, and the body’s role in generating that
experience.
Alison McMahan has investigated the terminology used to
describe the specific experience of engaging virtual environments,
especially in 3-D video games‘. She examines the concept of
“immersion” as it is used in virtual reality research, and discovers that
it has become a vague, all-inclusive concept, and is often confused
with the related term “presence.” Whereas “immersion” is modelled
on the experience of being submerged under water, of being
surrounded by a completely other reality (in Janet Murray’s
definitionz), “presence” refers to “the artificial sense that a user has in
a virtual environment that the environment is unmediated”3'
Immersion is only one factor that leads to the sense of presence
(others include the quality of social interaction available in the virtual
reality environment and the user’s ability to accomplish significant
actions in that environment). T
McMahan uses this definition of presence to analyze the
experience generated from the recent shift to 3-D video game design
and an increasing use of first person point of view, both of which
increase the game player’s sense of presence, by means of perspective
and a plethora of visual signs to simulate a physical environment.
McMahan also emphasises that an increased sense of presence can be
gained from the projection of the player’s body image into the game.
l A. MCMAHAN, “Immersion, engagement, and presence: a method for analyzing 3-
D video games,” in Video Game Theory, edited by Mark J. P. Wolf and Bernard
Perron, Routledge, forthcoming.
2 rm, p. 2.
3 M. LOMBARD and T. DITTON, quoted in A. MCMAHAN, op. cit., p. 9.
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(The player’s presence is further increased by means of his or her
interaction with the 3-D environment, an option not open to film
spectators). The projection of the player’s body image into the game
is sometimes literally figured, in the form of the player’s hands
(usually pointing a gun straight ahead) graphically represented on the
edge of the bottom frame line, or more fully in the form of an avatar -
“textual or graphic representations of users that include a character
designed to fit into the fictional environment in question, complete
with a set of personality traits, skills, and health status”1.
The study of presence in 3-D video games parallels the study of
deixis in film. Presence is the result of perceptual and psychological
immersion in an environment? Perceptual immersion involves
blocking off as much sensory perception of the outside world in order
to focus attention exclusively on the artificial world (or, in Biihler’s
terms, an attempt to eradicate ocular deixis and replace it with
imagination~oriented deixis). Psychological immersion involves the
film spectator’s/game player’s mental absorption into the artificial
environment, which necessarily includes the individual’s bodily
projection into that space (by means of perspective, a rich visual
environment, and interaction in the case of video games).
The paraphernalia recently invented to facilitate an individual’s
interface with virtual reality, including goggles, headphones, and
gloves, increase both perceptual and psychological immersion, and
therefore increases the individual’s presence in a virtual environment.
Yet, pace Currie, this new experience still involves processes
common to daydreaming and to consuming fiction -~ a combination of
real and virtual spaces, together with a process of projecting and
orienting oneself in the virtual space.
1 ttna, p. 10.
2 tote, p. 14.
